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1. Introduction
In this paper, I argue for the following two theses:
(CONTEXT) Degrees of belief change from context to context,
depending on the space of alternative possibilities.
(UNITY) Outright belief is belief to degree 1.
I call the conjunction of (CONTEXT) and (UNITY) credence-sensitivism,
or sometimes just sensitivism. Exactly what is meant by “space of alter-
native possibilities” will be made clearer once we get to §5, in which
I give an outline of a formal framework. Informally, the idea is that
one’s credences in a particular context are given by a function assign-
ing weights to each of the possibilities one takes seriously in that con-
text; when one comes to take more or fewer alternative possibilities
seriously, one’s credences are given by a different function.
Roughly speaking, the argument will go as follows: If (CONTEXT)
is true, the standard reasons for dismissing (UNITY) are undermined;
(UNITY) allows nice solutions to the standard problems for the most
popular account of the connection between outright belief and de-
grees of belief; and we can still fruitfully apply formal methods to
modelling degrees of belief while respecting (CONTEXT). If all this
is true, credence-sensitivism should be rather attractive. What is con-
spicuously absent from the plan, of course, is a positive argument for
adopting (CONTEXT). Over the course of the paper, however, a plausi-
ble story will emerge on which (CONTEXT) not only is true but does
some explanatory work. Furthermore, I argue in Clarke (MS) that an
adequate account of what makes an assertion sincere requires an ana-
logue of (CONTEXT) for outright belief — what I call belief-sensitivism,
as opposed to the view advanced here, credence-sensitivism. If that is
right, it provides some reason for thinking that (CONTEXT) is true;
but that argument is beyond the scope of this paper.
Now, a less rough version of the plan. In §2, I briefly survey the
dominant views on degrees of belief (standard Bayesianism) and their
relation to outright belief (the threshold view and the Lockean view).
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Then I go on to claim (§3) that (UNITY) provides a nice resolution
of Kyburg’s (1961) lottery paradox and (§4) that (CONTEXT) resolves
the usual problems with (UNITY). In §5, I describe my proposed way
of modelling degrees of belief. This section is more technical than the
rest of the paper, but less formally inclined readers can safely skip it
and still understand the rest of the paper; the point is simply to show
that the sort of context-sensitivity I advocate can be made formally re-
spectable. The framework presented in this section can be seen as a
modification of the subjective Bayesian approach to degrees of belief,
so I will argue in §6 that taking credences to be context-sensitive does
not threaten the usefulness of modelling degrees of belief probabilisti-
cally: the major explanatory triumphs of Bayesianism still go through
on my sensitivist revision of the Bayesian framework, and my version
of Bayesianism has some advantages over orthodoxy. Along the way,
some non-trivial questions arise (for future work) about how best to fit
probabilism and conditionalization into this sort of context-sensitive
framework. Finally, in §7, I briefly argue for some further virtues of
my view: it allows outright belief to have some bearing on action, it
answers Kaplan’s (1996) Bayesian Challenge, and it takes seriously the
thought that credences are degrees of belief.
2. Orthodox Formalism
I have already let on that the way of modelling degrees of belief I
favour is a modification of the standard subjective Bayesian framework.
It makes sense, then, to begin with a brief summary of the Bayesian
framework.
The Bayesian deals with ideally rational agents. Such an agent’s de-
grees of belief are modelled by a personal probability function, Pr(·).
(Bayesians thus endorse probabilism, the thesis that rationality requires
one’s degrees of belief to obey the probability calculus. We will have
much more to say about probabilism in §6.) The function takes propo-
sitions as arguments and returns real numbers between 0 and 1 as
values. Pr(p) = 1 means the agent has the highest confidence in p, or
is certain that p is true; Pr(p) = 0 means the agent is certain p is false;
and Pr(p) = 0.5 means she thinks p is as likely to be true as to be false.
Values in between 0.5 and 1 indicate that the agent takes p to be more
likely true than false, with increasing degrees of strength, and values
between 0.5 and 0 indicate the reverse. Because Pr(·) is a probability
function (i.e., it obeys the axioms of the probability calculus), we know
a few things about the degrees of belief of an ideal Bayesian agent: for
instance, every tautology gets credence 1 and every contradiction gets
0; any two logically equivalent propositions get the same credence; if
p entails q, then q gets at least as high a credence as p; and so on.
So much for statics. Diachronically, a Bayesian agent revises her de-
grees of belief only when she gains new evidence, and does so through
the process of updating by conditionalization. If she learns some new
evidence proposition, e, then she replaces her old personal probability
function Prold(·) with a new one, Prnew(·), defined by
Pr new(p) = Pr old(p|e),
where Pr(a|b) is the probability of a conditional on b, defined as Pr(a∧b)Pr(b) ,
provided Pr(b) 6= 0. Two consequences of this updating rule are worth
pointing out. First, if Prold(e) = 0, then Prnew(p) is undefined.1 So once
one has assigned probability 0 to a proposition, one cannot learn that
it is, after all, true. Second, if Prold(p) = 1, then Prnew(p) = 1 as well:
Prold(p|e) = 1, for any proposition e with Prold(e) 6= 0. So once one
has assigned a proposition probability 1, one’s credence in it can never
drop any lower. This should seem, at first, to be a problem for (UNITY);
in §4, I shall use (CONTEXT) to offer a way out.
1. There are, of course, ways of dealing with this problem, e.g., by taking
conditional probabilities as primitive and defining unconditional probabilities
in terms of them, rather than the other way around (Popper 1959). See Hájek
(2003) for a compelling argument against taking Pr(a ∧ b)/ Pr(b) as a definition
of Pr(a|b) rather than a constraint on Pr(a|b) in cases where Pr(b) is defined
and non-zero. However, there is no consensus on how best to deal with this
problem; even if one takes conditional probabilities as primitive, there is no
consensus on which axiomatization of conditional probability is correct. See
also note 15 on page 12.
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This is a standard view of credences. Now let’s examine a standard
view of how credences fit together with outright belief, which I’ll call
the threshold view. The threshold view has it that outright belief is belief
to a degree higher than some threshold value x < 1: one believes that
p (outright) if and only if Cr(p) ≥ x, where Cr(·) is one’s credence
function. (We drop the assumption of probabilism for the moment, so
we drop the “Pr” notation.) (UNITY) can, of course, be seen as a lim-
iting case of the threshold view: if the threshold x is set to 1, then the
threshold view coincides with (UNITY). However, there are qualitative
differences between the views that result from setting the threshold at
1 and setting the threshold below 1, so it is best not to think of (UNITY)
as a threshold view.
The threshold view is often coupled with a view about rational be-
lief which I’ll call the Lockean view, following Foley (1993), according to
which one is rational to believe p outright if and only if one is rational
to have a degree of belief that p higher than some threshold value y.2
To be perfectly clear: the threshold view has to do with the relationship
between outright belief and degrees of belief; the Lockean view has to
do with the relationship between rational belief and rational degrees
of belief. Generally, those who endorse both the Lockean view and the
threshold view, as Foley (1993) does, take it that the two thresholds, x
and y, coincide: that is, that one is rational to believe that p outright
2. This can be read in either a permissive or an obligatory way: one
is rationally required/permitted to believe that p iff one is rationally re-
quired/permitted to have Cr(p) > y. Bayesian orthodoxy has it that rational
degrees of belief are precise, and so (once one’s prior credence function is fixed)
exactly one credence is rationally permitted and hence also required. (Subjec-
tive and objective Bayesians differ over whether there are multiple permissible
prior credence functions.) There are a number of authors who have argued that
credences are best represented by sets of probability functions, but most of
them do not discuss the relation between outright belief and degrees of belief
(or at least, not in the same place). See, e.g., van Fraassen (2006), Joyce (2005),
Levi (1980), and Weirich (2001). Sturgeon (2008), notably, endorses the thresh-
old and Lockean views but thinks that degrees of belief are best represented
by sets of probability functions; so for him, there is a real difference between
what credences are rationally permissible and what credences are rationally
obligatory.
just in case one is rational to have a degree of belief high enough to
constitute or entail outright belief. But it is not obviously necessary
that the two thresholds should coincide.
There are some authors who endorse the Lockean view without en-
dorsing the threshold view. This, I think, is the best way to understand
Hawthorne and Bovens (1999), which aims to derive rules for rational
belief from the Lockean view plus probabilism on degrees of belief.
That is, Hawthorne and Bovens aim to answer the question, “Given
my degrees of belief, what ought I to believe outright?” But this ques-
tion makes no sense if one’s degrees of belief determine one’s outright
beliefs, as the threshold view would have it.3 On the other hand, I
know of no one who endorses the threshold view without endorsing
the Lockean view; but, of course, this should not be taken to mean that
the one view entails the other.
3. Problems for the Threshold View
3.1 The Lottery
Here is a problem for the threshold view, based on Kyburg’s (1961)
lottery paradox.
You own a lottery ticket. You know that there are n tickets in the
lottery, that exactly one winner will be selected, that each ticket has
an equal chance of winning, and that each ticket’s winning or losing
is independent of each other ticket’s winning or losing. You have cre-
dences corresponding to these propositions: For any ticket i, let Wi be
the proposition that i wins and Li the proposition that i loses; then for
all i, you have Cr(Li) = 1− Cr(Wi) = n−1n . Furthermore, for any set
of tickets S with m members, you have Cr(LS) = ( n−1n )
m, where LS is
the proposition that all of the tickets in S lose. These credences simply
reflect your (accurate) beliefs about how the lottery is set up.
Now here is the problem: Is it possible for you not to believe that
your ticket will lose? On the threshold view, if n is sufficiently high,
this is impossible. For whatever the value of the threshold of belief,
3. Weatherson (2005) makes essentially the same point.
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x, there will be some n such that n−1n ≥ x. This is strikingly unintu-
itive. Certainly there are cases of people who fail to believe that certain
particular tickets (their own or others’) will lose what they believe to
be large, fair lotteries; it is hard to make sense of the idea that none
of these people can have credences that accurately reflect their beliefs
about the fairness and size of the lotteries in question.
(UNITY) lets us avoid this problem. There is no lottery large enough
to make n−1n = 1.
Note that the version of the paradox here is distinct from a related
version of the paradox widely discussed in the literature (and which
is closer to Kyburg’s original formulation of the paradox).4 I have in
mind the version of the paradox used to make trouble for the Lockean
view, possibly but not necessarily in combination with the threshold
view. For clarity, let us refer to the two versions of the paradox as
the threshold lottery paradox and the Lockean lottery paradox, respectively.
Whereas the threshold lottery paradox described above is a problem
for certain accounts of belief, the Lockean lottery paradox is a prob-
lem for certain accounts of rational belief. Here, the problem would
be as follows: For each ticket i, your knowledge that the lottery is fair
makes it rational for you to have Cr(Li) = n−1n ≥ y, where y is the
threshold for rational belief. Thus, you are rational to believe Li out-
right, for each ticket i. However, you are also rational to believe that
exactly one ticket will win; thus, you are rational to believe that at least
one of the Li is false. Given some additional assumptions, 5 it follows
4. Kaplan (1981) makes essentially the distinction to come in this paragraph,
between the threshold and Lockean versions of the lottery paradox.
5. Notably, the assumption that it is rational to believe the conjunction p ∧ q
if it is rational to believe p and rational to believe q often features in the pre-
sentation of the problem. However, if this assumption is correct, and if rational
degrees of belief satisfy the probability calculus, then the Lockean view must
be false. For any two independent propositions p and q, the rational agent will
have Cr(p ∧ q) = Cr(p) · Cr(q), which will be lower than either Cr(p) or Cr(q)
if neither is believed to degree 1; thus, if Cr(p) and Cr(q) are only slightly
above the threshold y, then Cr(p ∧ q) will be below y. Thus, we would have a
case where it is rational to believe p and to believe q but not rational to believe
their conjunction p ∧ q.
that you are rational to believe a contradiction. This conflicts with the
intuitive principle of noncontradiction. One response to this problem,
taken by Foley (1993) and Hawthorne and Bovens (1999), is to reject
the principle of noncontradiction.
The threshold lottery paradox is more difficult than the Lockean
lottery paradox. It will not do simply to reject the principle of noncon-
tradiction — or any other principle of rationality for that matter. The
problem has nothing to do with what beliefs are rational for an agent;
rather, it has to do with what beliefs are even possible for an agent. Ac-
cording to the threshold view, if you believe that the lottery is fair and
that it is sufficiently large, and if your degrees of belief reflect this, then
you must believe of each ticket that it will lose. According to the thresh-
old view, it is not merely irrational but impossible not to believe that
your lottery ticket will lose. An advantage of the threshold view over
eliminativism (the Jeffrey-1992-style view that we should eliminate the
notion of outright belief in favour of credences) is that it holds on to
belief-talk — it counts talk about outright belief as legitimate. This is
an advantage because much of our ordinary and theoretical reason-
ing about knowledge and rationality appeals to outright belief. But the
threshold lottery paradox shows that this advantage of the threshold
view is overblown, for the threshold view forces a radically revisionist
view of some of our belief-talk: it turns out that nobody ever believes
that she owns a ticket which might win a fair lottery of any size. This is
still not quite so bad as saying that all belief-talk is illegitimate or must
be reinterpreted as credence-talk, but the difference is one of degree,
However, rejecting the above assumption is itself an intuitive cost to the
Lockean view. Furthermore, it is not necessary to rely on this assumption to
run the paradox. For example, one can massage the principle of noncontradic-
tion so that it rules out rationally believing all the members of an inconsistent
set, instead of just ruling out rational belief in a logically false proposition.
philosophers’ imprint - 4 - vol. 13, no. 11 (june, 2013)
roger clarke Belief Is Credence One (In Context)
not of kind.6
3.2 Other Problems
In this subsection, I will survey some other (at least prima facie) prob-
lems for the threshold view which have arisen in the literature and
argue they are not problems for (UNITY). I will not attempt to push
any of these problems as a decisive objection to the threshold view —
in fact, in one case I argue that the supposed problem is no problem at
all for the threshold view — but it is an advantage to be able to avoid
easily a number of problems which have been put forward in print.
First, note that there is a clear qualitative difference between belief
and lack of belief, but there is no clear qualitative difference between,
say, credence 0.9001 and credence 0.8999. If the threshold for belief is
0.9, then the former credence amounts to outright belief, but the latter
does not. To put the problem another way, here is Stalnaker (1984, 91):
One could easily enough define a concept of acceptance7
which identified it with a high subjective or epistemic proba-
bility (probability greater than some specified number between
one-half and one), but it is not clear what the point of doing so
would be. Once a subjective or epistemic probability value is as-
signed to a proposition, there is nothing more to be said about
its epistemic status. Bayesian decision theory gives a complete
account of how probability values, including high ones, ought
6. In discussions of the threshold or Lockean view and the lottery paradox,
it is common to see a discussion of the preface paradox (Makinson 1965). The
threshold and Lockean views are widely seen as giving a nice resolution of the
preface paradox, so it may seem convenient that I do not discuss the preface in
this paper. However, I omit discussion of the preface here because I discuss it in
another paper: to put it briefly, my account of outright belief itself allows a tidy
resolution of the preface paradox without appeal to talk of credences at all; this,
I take it, is an advantage of my approach, since the preface paradox concerns
the rationality of a certain collection of outright beliefs, not of credences.
7. For Stalnaker, belief is a species of acceptance, though there are other
species, such as assumption, supposition, and presumption. The difference be-
tween belief and acceptance is irrelevant to the point being made in the quoted
passage.
to guide behavior, in both the context of inquiry and the applica-
tion of belief outside of this context. So what could be the point
of selecting an interval near the top of the probability scale and
conferring on the propositions whose probability falls in that in-
terval the honorific title “accepted”? Unless acceptance has some
consequences, unless the way one classifies the propositions as
accepted, rejected, or judgment suspended makes a difference to
how the agent behaves, or ought to behave, it is difficult to see
how the concept of acceptance can have the interest and impor-
tance for inquiry that it seems to have.
If we know an agent’s credences, it is not clear what point there is to
asking the further question of what the agent believes outright. Any
question that might be answered using information about the agent’s
outright beliefs could be answered as well or better using information
about the agent’s credences, if the threshold view is correct. If we take
it for granted, as I think we should, that belief-talk is genuinely use-
ful and important, then this is a problem for the threshold view: the
threshold view threatens to render belief-talk pointless.
It should be clear that (UNITY) does not have this problem. There is
a qualitative difference between believing p to degree 1− e and believ-
ing it to degree 1: it is the difference between having some doubt that p
and having no doubt that p. One who believes p to degree 1 will not re-
gard a bet on p as risky; this is not so for one who believes p to degree
1− e. To be sure, if e is small enough, the agent may wind up making
all the same p-related decisions, but one reasons differently under risk
than otherwise. One who believes p to degree 1 will not seek further
evidence for or against p, but one who believes p to degree 1− e will
do so, provided the cost of seeking evidence is not too great and the
prospects of finding such evidence is good enough. There is a clear
point to distinguishing the propositions an agent believes to degree 1;
belief-talk is not pointless if (UNITY) is true.
There is another qualitative difference between credence 1 and any
lesser credence, of particular interest to Bayesians: if you give p cre-
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dence 1, and your credences change only via conditionalization, then
you will never give p any lesser credence, as we saw in §2. We cannot
say the same for any credence lower than 1, except for 0. However, I
cannot wholeheartedly endorse this argument, because the status of
updating via conditionalization is less clear on my view than it is on
the orthodox Bayesian view; see §6 for more on this point.
Second, Fantl and McGrath (2009, 141) list the following “apparent
facts about outright belief”:
The truth standard. If you believe p and p is false, then you are
mistaken about whether p, and if you believe p and p is true,
then you are right about whether p.
Transparency. Strength of justification for p is directly propor-
tional to the strength of justification you have for believing p.
Resolution. If you believe that p, then your mind is made up that
p.
Fantl and McGrath then go on to argue that the threshold view
cannot account for these apparent facts; I will consider each of their
arguments and conclude that given (UNITY), we can account for all
three apparent facts.
The truth standard. The trouble for the threshold view here is that
giving p high credence does not seem to mean commitment to the
truth of p. If one’s credence in p is 0.99, then one thinks that p is very
likely, but one allows that p might be false. As Fantl and McGrath write:
“If you are told: ‘Ha, so you were wrong about whether p, weren’t
you?’ you could reasonably say in your defense: ‘Look, I took no stand
about whether p was true or not; I just assigned it a high probability; I
assigned its negation a probability, too’ ” (2009, 141).
On the other hand, if one believes p to degree 1, and p turns out
to be false, it is hard to see how one could reasonably claim not to
have been wrong about p. There was no alternative to p to which one
assigned a non-zero probability; one did not take not-p to be a live
possibility. In particular, the response Fantl and McGrath offer above
is not available.
Fantl and McGrath also point out that in high-stakes situations,
agents who give p high credence may nevertheless say things like “I
don’t want to be wrong that p” and refuse to rely on p in their actions.
They claim that this is “some evidence that ordinary folk are thinking
of a belief state that isn’t [threshold] belief but is more closely tied to
action” (2009, 142). I take it the idea is that these agents refuse to rely
on p in their actions because to do so when p is false would mean that
they are wrong that p; and this is the same sort of being wrong about
p which applies to outright belief that p.
I find this argument unconvincing.8 First, it seems to me there is a
clear sense of being wrong that p or about p which has nothing to do
with belief. One who performs an action which is beneficial or optimal
if and only if p is true was wrong to do so if p is false, in a certain
sense; and this is still true even if the agent did not believe that p. For
example, suppose the A train would take me where I want to go, and
the B train would take me away from where I want to go. Suppose I
have 60% confidence that the train in front of me is an A train and 40%
confidence that it is a B train. I certainly do not believe that the train is
an A train; I have not formed an outright belief. Nevertheless, if I get
on the train, and it turns out to be a B train, it is natural to describe me
as having been wrong about whether it was an A train or wrong that
it was an A train. It does not matter to this sense of being wrong what
my beliefs are.
Transparency. The crucial claim in Fantl and McGrath’s argument
here is that something might justify one in increasing one’s credence
that p without giving any justification for having a high credence that
p. But according to the threshold view, believing that p outright is
the same as having a high credence that p; so something might jus-
8. Though, to be fair, Fantl and McGrath only claim that there is “some ev-
idence” for an action-centric notion of belief here. It is possible that the fol-
lowing only answers a bolder argument than the one they mean to endorse;
nevertheless, I think it is worthwhile to explore alternative ways of explaining
the phenomenon in question.
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tify increasing one’s credence that p without giving any justification
for believing that p. This violates Transparency, provided that giving
justification for increasing one’s credence that p entails giving justifica-
tion for p. The example Fantl and McGrath give is of buying a lottery
ticket: buying a lottery ticket in a large lottery, they say, slightly in-
creases your justification for believing that you will win the lottery;
however, they claim that it does not give any justification at all for
having a high credence that you will win the lottery. Note that this
argument weighs against (UNITY) as well as the threshold view, for
credence 1 is a species of high credence.
I think the argument for Transparency is too quick. Plausibly, if
one’s evidence requires one to have credence x that p, then one is more
justified by one’s evidence in having credence x+ e in p than in having
credence x+ δ in p if |e| < |δ|. That is, if one’s credences deviate further
from the rationally required or optimal credence, then one’s credences
are less justified. It follows, then, that if one receives some evidence
that justifies raising one’s credence in p by some amount, then that
evidence also justifies one in having a high credence that p, although
this may not be a very high degree of justification. If one buys a ticket
in a fair lottery of 1,000 tickets, one thereby comes to be (fully) justified
in having a credence of 0.001 that one will win the lottery (provided
one keeps one’s ticket, etc.). But one also gains some justification for
having a credence of 0.9 that one will win the lottery: whereas before
buying the ticket, such a credence would differ from rationality by 0.9,
now it differs from rationality by only 0.899. This is a small increase in
justification, to be sure, but it is an increase.
Of course, the argument of the preceding paragraph relies on a
certain view of justification of credences for which I have not argued.
However, my point here is that Fantl and McGrath need to supply
some conflicting view of justification of credences in order for their
objection to the threshold view to go through. It is not obvious that
this can be done unproblematically.
Resolution. Here it is fairly clear what the problem is for the thresh-
old view and why there is no problem for (UNITY). An agent who has
a high, but sub-unity, credence that p may well do things like seek fur-
ther evidence that p and refuse to act on the assumption that p without
further evidence. (This is particularly likely in high-stakes cases.) It is
hard to describe such an agent as having her mind made up that p. On
the other hand, if an agent gives p credence 1, she will not engage in
any such activities, since there are no live not-p possibilities for her.
4. (CONTEXT) Makes (UNITY) Plausible
It is standardly held that (UNITY) puts too strict a condition on out-
right belief: if outright belief requires the highest possible degree of
belief, it is thought, then ordinary people rarely or perhaps never have
any outright beliefs, and rational people might believe only tautologies
outright. Here are some representative passages:
Indeed, it might not even matter much where the threshold is as
long as we are consistent in applying it. There are some restric-
tions, of course. We won’t want to require subjective certainty
for belief. So, the threshold shouldn’t be that high. . . . Suppose
that degrees of belief can be measured on a scale from 0 to 1,
with 1 representing subjective certainty. Let the threshold x re-
quired for belief be any real number less than 1. . . . [W]e have
already agreed that x need not be 1. Subjective certainty is not
required for belief. (Foley 2009, 38–9; cf. Foley 1993, 143–4)
What is the relation between acceptance and probability? One
suggestion would be to identify acceptance of a hypothesis with
assignment of probability 1 to that hypothesis. But this view is
untenable. For to give hypothesis H probability 1 is to be willing
to bet on it at any odds; for example, a person who gave H prob-
ability 1 would be willing to accept a bet in which the person
wins a penny if H is true, and dies a horrible death if H is false.
I think it is clear that scientists are not usually this confident of
the hypotheses they sincerely categorically assert, and thus that
probability 1 is not a necessary condition for acceptance.
(Maher 1993, 133)
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[T]he usual view seems to be that you do not need to be abso-
lutely certain of H (give it probability 1) in order to believe it. For
one thing, it is usually supposed that there is very little we can
be rationally certain of, but that we can nevertheless rationally
hold beliefs on a wide range of topics. (Maher 1993, 152)
The Certainty View [is as follows:] You count as believing p just
if you assign [Cr(p)] the value 1. . . . [T]he Certainty View takes
belief to entail so great a commitment that (i) for each of your
beliefs, you must be prepared, for no gain, to gamble any sum
that it is true, (ii) you must be prepared to make a like gamble,
for each hypothesis that is incompatible with one of your beliefs,
that this hypothesis is false, and (iii) you must be prepared to
make a like gamble that you haven’t even one false belief. Given
this much, it is hard to see how there can be very much you
have any business believing. The conclusion is inescapable. If,
in focusing on what we are justified in believing (rational to
believe), traditional epistemology is concerned with anything at
all central to our lives as inquirers, then the Certainty View must
be mistaken. (Kaplan 1996, 91, 93)
[(UNITY)] is, I think, less plausible [than the threshold view]. If
the binary conception of belief derives its plausibility from our
habit of making unqualified assertions, and from our ordinary
ways of thinking and talking about belief, then the plausible
notion of binary belief is of an attitude that falls far short of ab-
solute certainty. We often assert, or say that we believe, all kinds
of things of which we are not absolutely certain. This is particu-
larly clear if the plausibility of the graded conception of belief is
rooted in part in how belief informs practical decision. Insofar
as degree of belief is correlated with practical decision-making,
the highest degree of belief in P is correlated with making de-
cisions that completely dismiss even the tiniest chance of P’s
falsity. For example, having degree of belief 1 in Jocko’s having
cheated would correlate with being willing literally to bet one’s
life on Jocko’s having cheated, even for a trivial reward. Surely
this level of certainty is not expressed by ordinary unqualified
assertions; nor is it what we usually want to indicate about our-
selves when we say, e.g., “I believe that Jocko cheated,” or what
we want to indicate about others when we say, e.g., “Yolanda
believes that Jocko cheated.” (Christensen 2004, 21)
Consider first the suggestion that flat-out belief is maximum con-
fidence — a view reflected in the frequent use of the term “full
belief” for flat-out belief. The problem here is that one can be-
lieve something, in the everyday sense, without being certain
of it. I believe that my grandmother was born on the 3rd of
August, but I am not absolutely certain of it. I may have mis-
remembered or been misinformed. Nor is this lack of certainty
necessarily a bad thing; a fallibilist attitude to one’s own beliefs
has much to recommend it. Another difficulty for the full-belief
view arises in connection with practical reasoning. On Bayesian
principles, to assign a probability of 1 to a proposition is to cease
to contemplate the possibility that it is false and, consequently,
to ignore the undesirability of any outcome contingent upon its
falsity. One consequence of this is that if one is certain of some-
thing, then one should be prepared, on pain of irrationality, to
bet everything one has on its truth for no return at all. For one
will simply discount the possibility of losing the bet. . . . Yet we
can believe something, in the everyday sense, without being pre-
pared to stake everything, or even very much, on its truth. (I
would bet something, but not a great deal, on the truth of my
belief about my grandmother’s birth date). So flat-out belief is
not the same thing as maximum probability.9
9. Frankish continues:
A third problem for the full-belief view is that it does not extend to de-
sire. One can desire something, in the everyday sense, without assigning
it maximum desirability. I want a new car, but I do not regard a new car
as the most desirable thing in the world.
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(Frankish 2009, 79)
[(UNITY)] is problematic for obvious reasons: it threatens robust
skepticism about belief (many of the things we thought we be-
lieved, we don’t) and if the view is true then fallibilism about
justified belief is false. (Fantl and McGrath 2009, 134)
There are, I think, two main versions of the worry that (UNITY) sets
too strict a standard for outright belief (with some overlap between the
two): the betting worry and the certainty worry.
The betting worry starts from some sort of connection between par-
tial beliefs and betting behaviour or betting dispositions.10 Roughly,
one believes that p to degree x if and/or only if11 one is inclined to
regard as fair a bet where one would win $S · (1− x) if p is true and
lose $S · x if p is false, where S is some appropriate real number rep-
resenting a stake. The idea is that, using x as the probability that p is
true, the expected value of such a bet would be zero. On this picture,
believing p to degree 1 would mean regarding as fair a bet where one
would stand to win nothing or nearly nothing should p turn out to
be true but would lose some substantial amount should p turn out to
be false. If it is part of the picture that S can take very large values,
it is particularly unintuitive that ordinary people would regard bets at
such long odds as fair, when p is some commonplace contingent propo-
sition. Few people would regard as fair (in the sense of not favouring
I will not address this problem.
10. Some connection of this sort is often given as an analysis, or interpretation,
of the subjective probabilities found in the orthodox Bayesian formalism; how-
ever, see Eriksson and Hájek (2007) for a convincing argument that no such
analysis can be satisfactory.
11. There are various versions of the connection between credences and betting
behaviour/dispositions attested in the literature. For present purposes, the dif-
ferences among them — whether the property of interest is betting behaviour,
or betting dispositions, or dispositions to regard certain bets as fair, or indiffer-
ence between sides of a bet; whether betting behaviour/dispositions/etc. are
supposed to provide an analysis of credence, or a way of measuring credence,
or some other kind of connection — make no difference. In all versions, the
problem with credence 1 is similar.
either side) a bet where they stand to gain a penny or lose their home
on the proposition that Barack Obama was once elected president of
the United States, but surely most people should count as believing
this proposition outright.
Given (CONTEXT), the betting worry looks much less plausible.
The key insight is that offering a bet means changing the context. When
the practical importance of p changes, as it must when a bet is offered,
the space of salient alternatives to p may also change. When I am of-
fered a bet on p at very long odds and/or very high stakes, I am likely
to worry more about whether p is true after all and consider a wider
range of alternative possibilities. For example, if I am offered a bet
where I would win a dollar if Barack Obama is the current president
of the United States or lose my home if he is not, I will think some-
thing like the following to myself: “Am I sure that I’ll win this bet? Is
there something I might have been overlooking? I don’t want to lose
all that money, and I don’t stand to gain much in comparison.” I will
probably think of scenarios in which Obama is no longer president
which I was previously ruling out or ignoring (maybe he resigned just
a few minutes ago and the news has yet to reach me); I will be more
careful about ruling those possibilities out and may decide not to rule
all of them out after all. If I do not rule out all unignored counter-
possibilities to the proposition that Obama is president, then I will no
longer give that proposition credence 1. I will also no longer believe
that proposition, according to (UNITY).
I think this fits the standard intuitions about these extreme betting
cases: when one stands to lose a lot if p is false, one is less likely not
only to act on p but to assert sincerely that p. Having had the thoughts
above, I am still likely to be comfortable saying things like “Obama is
probably president” or “I’m pretty sure that Obama is president,” but
I am not likely to say flat-out, “Obama is president.” One is especially
likely to say the former sort of thing — that p is probable — if one is
criticized for refusing a bet on p: “I thought you said that p — how
can you turn down this bet?” — “Well, I really only think it’s very
likely that p, but it’s not that likely.” All of this suggests that someone
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rejecting an extreme bet on p does not believe p while rejecting the bet.
(Of course, it’s also likely that I will reject the bet simply on the
grounds that I do not want to risk my home at all, no matter how sure
I am that the relevant proposition is true. But this is just to say that the
betting worry about (UNITY) has somewhat less intuitive appeal than
it might seem at first.)
Here is my response to the betting worry again, in a bit more de-
tail. Assume (CONTEXT) is true. Suppose I have Cr1(p) = 1, where
Cr1(·) is my probabilistically coherent credence function. Now sup-
pose I am offered a bet according to which I would gain $1 if p or lose
my home if ¬p. The expected value of this bet, according to Cr1(·), is
$1, no matter what utility I assign to losing my home, for the expected
value of the bet is given by Cr1(p) · $1 + Cr1(¬p) · u(nohome), where
u(nohome) is the (large negative) utility I assign to losing my home;
since Cr1(p) = 1 and Cr1(¬p) = 0, the expected value of the bet is
1 · $1 + 0 · u(nohome) = $1. Therefore, I should accept the bet, since
doing so has positive expected value.
But being offered this bet changes the practical importance of p for
me. Before the bet was offered, I had no reason to think the falsity of p
might lead to my losing my home (or at least, we can easily choose p so
that this is the case). The dramatically increased practical importance
of p can lead me to take erstwhile-ignored possibilities seriously; I
may be more careful about what I am willing to rule out. Thus, my
credences will no longer be given by the function Cr1(·) but by a new
function Cr2(·), defined over the expanded space of possibilities. (For a
more precise account of the shift from Cr1(·) to Cr2(·), see §5.) The fact
that in the new context, where my credences are given by Cr2(·), I take
seriously some possibilities I ruled out in the old context, where my
credences were given by Cr1, means that there are some propositions
q such that Cr2(q) > Cr1(q) = 0. If there is such a proposition q which
I take to entail ¬p, and Cr2(·) is probabilistically coherent, then it will
be the case that Cr2(p) < Cr1(p) = 1. If Cr2(p) is low enough, then the
bet under consideration will have negative expected value according
to my revised credences, and so I will not accept it.
Here is an objection to the line of argument above, due to an anony-
mous referee. Consider sayings like “She talks the talk, but she doesn’t
walk the walk” or “He is not prepared to put his money where his
mouth is.” The familiar, standard criticism expressed by these sayings
seems to involve a tie between belief and willingness to bet. We might
reasonably say that one is worthy of criticism if one is willing to as-
sert a proposition but not willing to make a bet at non-trivial stakes
that the proposition is true. Moreover, a natural interpretation of the
criticism takes it to involve a sort of insincerity: the criticized person
represents herself as having a greater confidence in the proposition as-
serted than her actions reveal her to have. Therefore, our practice of
employing criticisms of this sort presupposes that our actions reveal
our credences — that there is a closer tie between betting behaviour
and belief/credence than the sensitivist wants to admit.
My response to this objection leads naturally into my response to
the certainty worry, which we come to presently. We can understand
the criticisms of the previous paragraph as complaining about a lack
of stability in the criticized person’s beliefs. People who don’t “walk
the walk,” I claim, have the same sort of failing as people who don’t
stick around “when the going gets tough”. The problem with people
who won’t “put their money where their mouth is” is not that they do
not genuinely believe the things they say but that they cease to believe
them when their beliefs become important. (Recall that the sensitivist
does think there is a tight connection between one’s current credence
and one’s current willingness to bet; what the sensitivist denies is that
we can easily infer one’s willingness to bet in one context from one’s
credences in another context.) The lesson here, which is the lesson of
the sensitivist response to the certainty worry, is that there is more
to one’s belief state than one’s current beliefs or current credences; a
person can be criticized for other kinds of doxastic facts, so to speak.
The certainty worry is vaguer than the betting worry but less
closely tied to problematic views about partial belief and betting be-
haviour/dispositions. Here, the trouble is that believing p to degree 1
is interpreted as being certain that p — but sometimes people believe
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things without being certain. This worry is misguided: while it is true
that mere belief does not require certainty, belief to degree 1 should not
be taken to entail certainty. A fully satisfying response to the certainty
worry along these lines would require a more precise interpretation of
just what it means to have degree of belief 1 than I am prepared to give
here,12 but some remarks on certainty will give the flavour of a more
complete response.
For one thing, being certain that p seems to require stability of opin-
ion, just as with being willing to “put one’s money where one’s mouth
is”. If one is certain that p, then it must be difficult to move one to
abandon belief in p. For example, part of what it means for me to be
certain that the Earth is not flat, or that I did not answer to the nick-
name “Speedy” as a child, or that there are no genuine psychics, is that
it would be very hard to bring me to disbelieve these propositions. It
would take more, stronger, and better-presented evidence to make me
doubt that I was not nicknamed “Speedy” as a child (either believing
that I did have that nickname after all or withholding belief in either
proposition) than it would to convince me that, say, my mother was
nicknamed “Speedy” as a child. I believe that my mother had no such
nickname, but all it would take to make me believe otherwise would
be reliable-seeming testimony from one or two people who knew her
as a child; this would not suffice to make me even doubt whether I ever
answered to that nickname. The difference is that while I believe both
propositions, I am certain of only one. On the standard Bayesian for-
malism, degree of belief 1 is maximally stable for rational agents: as we
saw in §2, if one has Cr1(p) = 1, then there is no way to update by con-
ditionalization to get Cr2(p) < 1 (but see §6). Thus, at least for rational
agents, if one ever gives a proposition credence 1, one can never give
it a lower credence; if either the threshold view of belief or (UNITY)
12. I lean toward the approach to interpreting degrees of belief advocated in
Eriksson and Hájek (2007), according to which we take degree of belief as a
primitive concept and get at its meaning via the “platitudes” we take to be true
about it. Thus, I have not much to say about what it means for one to have
Cr(p) = 1 beyond giving a formal system for working with the function Cr(·).
is correct, then one will never withhold outright belief, either. But this
need not be so if (CONTEXT) is true. For according to (CONTEXT), an
agent’s degrees of belief vary with features of context other than her
evidence. In particular, on the modified Bayesian formalism I propose
below, credence functions are not always obtained by conditionaliza-
tion on previous credence functions. It is possible to have Cr1(p) = 1
and Cr2(p) < 1, as we will see in §5 Therefore, if (CONTEXT) is true,
it should be possible to believe p to degree 1 without being certain that
p, for certainty requires a stability of opinion that Cr(p) = 1 does not.
Thus, we see that neither the betting worry nor the certainty worry
give good reason to reject (UNITY), provided that (CONTEXT) is true. I
know of no other reason to reject the left-to-right direction of (UNITY).
5. New Formalism
I have argued that (UNITY) solves a number of problems faced by the
threshold view and that (CONTEXT) makes (UNITY) plausible. Now
I will sketch a formal framework for representing credences on which
(CONTEXT) and (UNITY) are true. The idea behind the formalism is to
represent contexts by sets of points, or possibilities — the possibilities
taken seriously by the agent in the context. We define a “global” cre-
dence function over the whole space of possibilities and derive “local”
credences in each particular context by restricting the global function
to the set of possibilities characterizing the context in question.
Let a credal state S for a set of propositions P be a quadruple
(US , CS , ‖·‖S , CrS ), where US is a universe of points, CS is a set of
subsets of US (contexts), ‖·‖S : P → US is a valuation function,13
and CrS : DS → [0, 1] is a conditional credence function (the agent’s
“global” credence function) whose domain D ⊆ P(U) × P(U) is as
follows.14 Let ‖P‖ ⊆ P(U) be the set {‖p‖ |p ∈ P} of the valuations
13. The valuation need not be classical. We are not modelling only rational
agents’ credences, so we cannot assume, e.g., that contradictions are false at
every point. Generally, we can see the valuation as encoding information about
the agent’s logical beliefs, in a manner of speaking.
14. The subscripts on U, C, ‖·‖, D, and Cr will be suppressed where there is
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of the propositions in P. Then D is a superset of U × C and ‖P‖ × C.
We write the value of Cr on an ordered pair (X, Y) ∈ D as Cr(X|Y)
if Y 6= U and call this value the agent’s global credence (or degree
of belief) in X, conditional on Y (or given Y). (Note that, despite the
notation, we do not stipulate that Cr(X|Y) = Cr(X∩Y)Cr(Y) when Cr(Y) > 0.
This is, in part, because we are not dealing only with ideally rational
agents.) When Y = U, we write Cr(X) and call this value the agent’s
(unconditional) global credence in X. So, our constraint on D amounts
to ensuring that Cr({x}|C), and Cr(‖p‖ |C) are defined, for x ∈ U,
C ∈ C, and p ∈ P. D will usually be larger than required, with, e.g.,
CrC(‖p‖ | ‖q‖) often being defined for p, q ∈ P and C ∈ C.15
Sometimes, for convenience, we will write as if Cr took proposi-
tions, rather than subsets of U, as arguments. In general, for p, q ∈ P,
Cr(p|q) is to be understood as Cr(‖p‖ | ‖q‖), and likewise for expres-
sions with a name of a proposition in one argument-place and a name
of a set in the other. Similarly, it will sometimes be convenient to have
a shorthand for the proposition that possibility x is actual. So, for ev-
ery point x ∈ U, let px be the proposition that x is actual; that is,
‖px‖ = {x}. Call such a proposition the characteristic proposition for
the point x. Likewise, for every context C ∈ C, let pC be the proposition
that one of the members of C is actual; that is, ‖pC‖ = C. Call such a
proposition the characteristic proposition for the context C.
If C ∈ C is the current context, then the agent’s current degree
of belief that p ∈ P is given by Cr(p|C); in other words, the agent’s
degree of belief that p in context C is given by the global credence in
p conditional on the proposition that one of the possibilities x ∈ C is
actual. We can thus define a function CrC : D∩ [P(U)×P(C)]→ [0, 1]
giving the agent’s credences in context C: let CrC(X|Y) = Cr(X|Y ∩ C)
for all sets X, Y with (X, Y∩C) ∈ D∩ [P(U)×P(C)]. Call CrC a “local”
no ambiguity.
15. Since we are not dealing with rational credence, it need not trouble us
that there is no agreement on how best to axiomatize conditional probability (cf.
note 1 on page 2): since the credences we are dealing with here need not be
rational, they need not be probabilities.
credence function. Where C ⊆ Y, write CrC(X) instead of CrC(X|Y),
and call this value the agent’s (unconditional) local credence in X.
Now we can state the reason for taking conditional rather than un-
conditional global credences as primitive. All actual agents’ credences
are contextual and thus given by a local credence function, not a global
one. The global credence function tells us how the agent’s various lo-
cal credence functions hang together, so to speak — it tells us how an
agent’s credences will change given a change in context. But an uncon-
ditional global credence tells us nothing about the agent in any par-
ticular context; it has no particular link to any local credence function.
Thus, there is no need to ensure that unconditional global credences
will be defined. Conditional global credences, on the other hand, tell
us how local credence functions will behave, and so are essential to the
framework.
So much for (CONTEXT); what about (UNITY)? The latter thesis
has to do with the relationship between credences and outright belief,
but our framework so far concerns only credences. Therefore, all we
need stipulate to make (UNITY) come out true is that the agent be-
lieves that p in a context C just in case CrC(p) = 1. But we should not
be quite so cavalier: the framework may then have undesirable conse-
quences for outright belief. I have argued in Clarke (MS) and Clarke
(2012) for an independently motivated picture of outright belief which
is context-sensitive along the lines of (CONTEXT); roughly put, the
view there is that to believe that p in a context C (characterized, as
here, by a set of possibilities) is to rule out all possibilities in C where
p does not hold. Unfortunately, a full discussion of that account and its
relationship to the framework described in this section would take us
too far afield. Still, the sketch of a formal account of credences we have
here is enough to give the credence-sensitivist view some substance
and to allow us to ask whether one can coherently be both a Bayesian
and a sensitivist. That is the topic of the next section.
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6. It’s Still OK to Be a Bayesian
In the final two sections of this paper, I will give some discussion of the
account of belief and credence described above. First, in this section, I
argue that my credence-sensitivist view is compatible with a version
of Bayesianism. In the next section, I will argue that my view has some
further virtues.
What makes a theory of partial belief Bayesian? Well, two main
things, as I see it: first, that ideally rational agents’ credences satisfy
the probability calculus (probabilism); and, second, that ideally ra-
tional agents’ credences are updated by conditionalization. There are
multiple plausible versions of probabilism compatible with the frame-
work of §5. Minimally, probabilism should require that for each C ∈ C,
CrC(·) satisfies the probability axioms. But probabilists will generally
want more than this, I think. For one thing, there is the constraint
that we should have Cr(X|Y ∩ Z) = Cr(X∩Y|Z)Cr(Y|Z) whenever Cr(X|Y ∩ Z),
Cr(X ∩ Y|Z), and Cr(Y|Z) are all defined and Cr(Y|Z) > 0. This con-
straint does not follow from the probability axioms themselves, but
see Hájek (2003, §9) for an argument that it is a good constraint for
conditional probabilities. For the orthodox Bayesian, this constraint
comes out as trivially true, by the definition of Cr(X|Y); but unlike
the orthodox Bayesian, I take conditional probabilities as primitive,
rather than defining them in terms of unconditional probabilities. (Cf.
note 1 on page 2 and note 15 on the previous page.) We might slightly
strengthen the constraint to demand that whenever Cr(Y|Z) is defined
and positive, Cr(X|Y ∩ Z) and Cr(X ∩Y|Z) should also be defined, for
all Z ⊆ U with Y ∩ Z 6= ∅. Finally, we might want the global credence
function Cr(·) itself to satisfy the probability axioms. (This last require-
ment would have to be interpreted as a requirement on how one’s
credences should cohere across contexts, rather than as a synchronic
requirement on one’s credences; one’s credences at any particular time
are given by one of the local credence functions CrC. We will return to
this point below.) Note, incidentally, that if the global credence function
satisfies the probability axioms plus the above identity for conditional
probabilities, then it follows that each of the local credence functions
will also satisfy the probability axioms; but the converse implication
is false. The important thing to note about all of these requirements
is that they are all perfectly compatible with the credence-sensitivist
framework. Sensitivists can be probabilists.
The credence-sensitivist framework is also compatible with mul-
tiple versions of the Bayesian rule of updating by conditionaliza-
tion. Minimally, we can require that CrC(p|q) be defined (i.e., that
Cr(‖p‖ | ‖q‖ ∩ C) is defined for all p, q ∈ P) and then say that when
one learns in context C that q, one’s new credence that p in context
C should be CrCnew(p) = CrCold(p|q). Things get more interesting when
we look at how contexts must change, both locally and globally, when
one acquires new evidence. Locally, we might say that when one learns
that q, one’s context must shift in some specified way, say to the largest
C′ ⊆ C with ‖¬q‖ ∩ C′ = ∅. Globally, we might require moving from
C to C ′, perhaps requiring that all contexts C′ ∈ C ′ assign CrC′ (q) = 1.
There is much to be explored in this direction, but that would be out-
side the scope of this paper. However, the credence-sensitivist frame-
work advanced here is clearly compatible with updating by condition-
alization, in some form.
Aside from the question of whether our framework is compatible
with the two main components of Bayesianism, there is of course the
question of whether the standard Dutch book arguments for each com-
ponent still go through. In brief, there is good news and bad news:
some Dutch book arguments still go through, but some do not. In
particular, the diachronic Dutch book arguments used to justify up-
dating by conditionalization do not work, because gaining new ev-
idence can result in a change of context — new possibilities may
come to be taken seriously. This will result in a change of the un-
derlying space on which one’s local credence function is defined in
what may not be a predictable (and hence, Dutch-book-exploitable)
way. On the other hand, synchronic Dutch book arguments may still
go through. For example, it is still the case that if, in context C, one has
CrC(p) = 0.7 and CrC(¬p) = 0.7, then one will regard as favourable
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both of the following bets: (1) a bet that costs $1 and pays $1.50 if p;
(2) a bet that costs $1 and pays $1.50 if ¬p. (Expected value of each bet:
($1.50)(0.7)− $1 = $0.05.) But if one buys both bets, then one is guar-
anteed to pay $2 but win back only $1.50 — a sure loss of $0.50. Here
we must assume that C is the context one would be in after the bets
have been offered. In general, as has been pointed out, offering a bet is
a way of bringing new possibilities into serious consideration. So syn-
chronic Dutch book arguments can be expected to work,16 but only for
the context in which a Dutch book has been offered; Dutch book argu-
ments cannot show that one’s local credence function in other contexts
ought to be probabilistic.
Of course, the so-called non-pragmatic or epistemic arguments for
probabilism should also go through exactly as well on a sensitivist as
on a non-sensitivist framework. See, e.g., Joyce (1998) and Leitgeb and
Pettigrew (2010a,b).
So I would describe the formal framework of §5 as broadly
Bayesian, or at least Bayesian-friendly, although it certainly diverges
from Bayesian orthodoxy. Note, in particular, that sensitivism lets us
preserve the main victories of Bayesianism.
The most celebrated Bayesian success stories — to follow the list
from Earman (1992): solving the ravens paradox,17 explaining the
value of surprising or novel evidence and of diverse evidence, and
shedding light on the Quine-Duhem problem and Goodman’s new
problem of induction — depend on the Bayesian account of confir-
mation. Therefore, my strategy here will be to show that sensitivists
can hold on to the Bayesian account of confirmation and thereby hold
on to the Bayesian success stories. For a Bayesian, an evidence propo-
16. Or rather, they can be expected to work exactly as well as they work in a
non-sensitivist framework. There are, of course, those who object to Dutch book
arguments on other grounds, and their objections will not be any stronger or
weaker on the present sensitivist framework.
17. I argue in Clarke (2010) that the Bayesian solution to the ravens paradox
is not ultimately satisfying; but this is for reasons independent of sensitivism.
The point here is that the Bayesian solution to the ravens paradox works exactly
as well for the sensitivist as for the orthodox Bayesian.
sition e confirms (disconfirms, is confirmationally irrelevant to) an hy-
pothesis h relative to background evidence k just in case Pr(h|e ∧ k)
is greater than (less than, equal to) Pr(h|k). The probability function
here is supposed to represent the credences of an ideally rational agent.
Typical Bayesian explanatory successes involve showing that, given cer-
tain background information about the case to be explained, any agent
whose credences are probabilistic and who updates them by condition-
alization must have her credence in h raised (or lowered, or unchanged)
by learning e; or that her credence in h must be raised more by e1 than
by e2, or that e raises her credence in h1 more than in h2, and so on.
Now, given that my sensitivist framework is compatible with requir-
ing that ideally rational agents have probabilistic credences and that
they update their credences by conditionalization, it follows that the
Bayesian account of confirmation is also compatible with my frame-
work; and if this is the case, then the explanatory successes of Bayesian
confirmation theory should carry over when the Bayesian moves to my
sensitivist framework.
For example, consider the standard Bayesian solution to the ravens
paradox. To be brief and to oversimplify, the Bayesian argues that since
non-black things are much more numerous than ravens, discovering
that a randomly selected object is a non-black non-raven is much less
improbable than discovering that the object is a black raven; accord-
ingly, a rational agent’s credence in the hypothesis that all ravens are
black — or, equivalently, that all non-black things are non-ravens —
should be increased much more by finding a black raven than by find-
ing a non-black non-raven. Here are the sorts of things that need to
be true for the Bayesian solution to work (cf. Vranas (2004, §2) for the
argument behind the Bayesian solution; here, “Ra” means that a is a
raven, “Ba” that a is black, and “H” that all ravens are black.):
1. Cr(Ra)/Cr(¬Ba) is minute. (Or, Cr(Ra) Cr(¬Ba).)
2. Cr(Ra|¬Ba) > 0.
3. Cr(Ba|H) = Cr(Ba).
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4. Cr(·) satisfies the probability axioms.18
The Bayesian wants to conclude that any agent whose relevant cre-
dences are rational and accurate will find that the hypothesis that all
ravens are black is confirmed to a much higher degree by finding a
black raven than by finding a non-black non-raven. 1 and 2 constitute
the requirement that the agent have accurate credences: she should
think that there are many more non-black things than there are ravens
(1) but should not already be ruling out the possibility of a non-black
raven (2). 4 is a rationality requirement. 3 may fall into either category;
the point of Vranas (2004) is that no satisfactory argument for 3 has
been offered.
There is no reason why this argument should not go through on
my sensitivist framework, given that it goes through on the orthodox
framework. So long as an agent’s credences are probabilistic, and meet
the conditions 1–3, the conclusion of the standard Bayesian solution
will hold. An agent who violates 1 or 2 misunderstands the situation
of the ravens paradox; the standard Bayesian solution has nothing to
say about such an agent. An agent who violates 4 is irrational by the
Bayesian’s lights; the standard Bayesian solution has nothing to say
about such an agent. An agent who violates 3 either misunderstands
the situation or is irrational, depending on what the justification for
3 is supposed to be; the standard Bayesian solution has nothing to
say about such an agent. It does not matter why the agent violates 1–
4: even if it is because some shift in context has caused the agent to
revise the possibility space underlying her credences, she still either
misunderstands the situation or is irrational. In short: the Bayesian can
say what he wants to say about all agents he wants to say it about.
Adding context-sensitivity to the picture saps none of the Bayesian’s
strength.
18. I write “Cr(·)” rather than “Cr(·|·)” because orthodox Bayesians usually
do not take conditional credence to be primitive, as I have, but rather take the
equation Cr(p|q) = Cr(p ∧ q)/Cr(q), Cr(q) > 0, to define conditional credence.
Cf. footnote 1 on page 2 and footnote 15 on page 12.
7. Some Further Virtues
In this section, I argue that my credence-sensitivist view has three nice
features: it draws a satisfying connection between outright belief and
action, it answers the so-called Bayesian Challenge, and it justifies us
in calling credences “degrees of belief”.
7.1 Belief and Action
Maher (1986) and Kaplan (1996, 103–5) point out that, if outright belief
is compatible with credence less than 1, then the following plausible-
sounding maxims must be false:
1. If one’s beliefs are rational, then it is rational to act on them. That
is, if it is rational for one to believe that p, then it is rational for one
to act as if p.
2. A rational person ought always to act in accordance with her beliefs,
or as if her beliefs were true.
3. To believe that p is to be disposed to act as if p.
Maher and Kaplan gloss “acting as if p,” and the other related locu-
tions above, as acting in a way that one believes would be optimal if
p is true. 1 and 2 are common-sense principles about rational action
and belief; variations on 3 are endorsed by, e.g., Braithwaite (1932) and
Marcus (1990, 140), as an analysis of belief.
Here is the reason none of these maxims would hold up. Suppose
you believe that p, but your credence in p is x < 1, and your cre-
dence in ¬p is (1 − x). Now you must choose between an action A
which is worth $0 whether p is true or false, and an action B which
is worth $1 if p is true and −$( x+S1−x ), for some positive number S, if
p is false. The expected value of A is 0, and the expected value of B
is x · $1− (1− x)($ x+S1−x ) = −$S; thus, A has a greater expected value
than B, and so if you are rational, you should do A rather than B. But
if p is true, then B is optimal: if p is true, then A is worth $0, and
B is worth $1. So if you were to act according to your beliefs, i.e., as
if p were true, then you would act irrationally. Furthermore, on some
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behaviouristic/dispositional interpretations of credence — e.g., if hav-
ing Cr(p) = x means being disposed to accept any bet on p at odds
x : 1− x or better — then it follows that you will not act according to
your belief that p in this case, regardless of whether you are rational.
It should be clear that this problem does not arise for the credence-
sensitivist, thanks to (UNITY). If you believe that p in the context of the
bet above, then you must have credence 1 that p. Thus, the maxims 1–3,
in some form, are still available on my account. I say “in some form”
because there is something importantly right in Maher and Kaplan’s
arguments. Consider the following two variations on a principle like 1
and 2:
4. If S believes that p at t, then at t, S should act on p.
5. If S believes that p at t, and S has not revised her beliefs between t
and t + e, then S should act on p at t + e.
I think 4 is right but 5 is wrong. If S believes that p at t, then S must
have Cr(p) = 1 at t; therefore, S should regard as optimal whatever
action would be optimal if p is true. This is why 4 is right. But between
times t and t + e, there may have been some change in S’s context so
that, despite not having changed or revised her credal state (globally),
she no longer has Cr(p) = 1 (locally). In particular, if she is offered
a bet on p carrying the risk of a heavy loss if it turns out that ¬p, S
is likely to have her credence in p drop, due to thinking of new ¬p-
possibilities which she was previously ignoring. Therefore, it might
turn out that, at t + e, S should not regard as optimal the action that
would be optimal in case p is true, for exactly the reasons Maher and
Kaplan point to.
Thus, sensitivism allows us to hold on to some of what is right
about both the traditional doctrine that one ought to act on one’s be-
liefs and Maher and Kaplan’s arguments against that doctrine.
7.2 Answering the Bayesian Challenge
Kaplan (1996, 98ff) poses what he calls the “Bayesian Challenge”.
Roughly, here it is: All we need for decision theory, and therefore all
we need to explain rational action, is credence, not outright belief; so
what is the point of talking about outright belief at all? What work
does outright belief do for us? What does it explain?
As Kaplan poses the Bayesian Challenge, it would be acceptable
to answer that outright belief is reducible to credence, so talk about
outright belief indirectly does the same work that talk about credence
does. Sensitivism can easily answer this version of the Challenge: to be-
lieve outright that p is to have Cr(p) = 1. But I think the Bayesian Chal-
lenge generalizes: even if belief is reducible to credence, we still have
the question of whether we are ever better off talking about outright
belief rather than credence. It would be very unsatisfying if belief-talk
could always be replaced with credence-talk without losing anything.
(Kaplan presents the Bayesian Challenge only after rejecting the possi-
bility of reducing belief to credence — because he rejects the threshold
view and (UNITY) — so it is not surprising that he gives the form of
the Challenge that he does.) That is, we can see the sort of objection
to the threshold view that I attributed to Stalnaker at the start of §3.2
as a generalization of the Bayesian Challenge. However, I have already
addressed that objection in §3.2, so I will not discuss it any further
here.
7.3 Degrees of What?
I have already mentioned, in note 10 on page 9 and note 12 on page 11,
that I am impressed by the arguments in Eriksson and Hájek (2007)
against analyses of credence in terms of betting behaviour (or anything
like it), and in favour of taking credence as a primitive, unanalyzed
term. Of course, one of the benefits of having an analysis of credence
is that we would always know what we mean when we say that some
agent has Cr(p) = x, or CrC(p) = x. On the other hand, if we take
credence as primitive, then we must rely on general platitudes to tell
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us what it means for an agent to have Cr(p) = x. Now, some of the
most central platitudes about credence have to do with the connection
between credence and outright belief: in particular, credences are, in
some sense, degrees of belief; to raise one’s credence that p is to increase
the degree to which one believes that p. I think this is one of the most
central platitudes about credence, in fact.
This is important for those of us who want to give an account of
outright belief in terms of credence, for such an account may conflict
with the platitude. In particular, consider Kaplan’s “Assertion View” of
belief (1996, 109–10): “You count as believing p just if, were your sole
aim to assert the truth (as it pertains to p), and your only options were
to assert that p, assert that ¬p or make neither assertion, you would
prefer to assert that p.” The Assertion View is supposed to meet the
Bayesian Challenge, because it explains the importance of belief to a
certain practice (“asserting hypotheses in the context of inquiry”), but
belief as defined by the Assertion View is not reducible to credence.
(As Kaplan puts it in stating the Bayesian Challenge, “belief is not a
state of confidence”.) This is, roughly, because the aim to assert the
truth involves weighing the goal of avoiding error against the goal of
comprehensiveness, and different people will weigh these goals differ-
ently; indeed a single person can be expected to weigh the two goals
differently with respect to different propositions. I do not intend to
give Kaplan’s Assertion View a full treatment here; I certainly agree
that highlighting the connection between belief and assertion is impor-
tant, but the point I want to make here is that the Assertion View seems
to violate the platitude quoted above. If belief that p is a disposition to
prefer to assert that p rather than assert ¬p or remain silent in a cer-
tain sort of context, it is not clear in what sense credences are degrees
of belief. To be sure, increasing credence that p makes it increasingly
likely that one believes that p, but raising one’s credence that p does
not mean that one believes that p more than previously.
This is an advantage of both the threshold view and (UNITY) over
views like Kaplan’s.19 Given (UNITY) or the threshold view, the sense
in which credences are degrees of belief, or partial beliefs, is obvious;
and so leaving credence unanalyzed is relatively safe.20
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